Although only 37 percent of the electorate turned out to vote,
less than the 50 percent needed for the results to be automatically
valid, the measure still could have passed if one-fourth of eligible
voters, or two million Hungarians, had voted in favor. For the
Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Union, Hungary’s largest opposition party
and the referendum’s main supporter, the final tally was tantalizingly
close with over 1.92 million votes in favor. But at the end of
the day, the failure to get those last 98,000 votes still meant
a victory of sorts for the governing coalition of the Hungarian
Socialist Party (MSZP) and the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats
(SZDSZ), both of which opposed the referendum.
The conservative Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) also opposed
the measure, although it stressed that the privatization of healthcare
institutions should only be allowed to non-profit organizations.
A referendum about politics
Make no mistake, the referendum was about politics, not policy.
In practical and professional terms, the referendum would have
had little immediate effect, since the referenced “law that runs
counter,” the so-called Hospital Act, had already been nullified
in December 2003.
The Constitutional Court struck down the act on procedural grounds,
ruling Parliament had not carried out a new debate in earnest after
Hungarian President Ferenc Mádl sent it back to the house for reconsideration
in June 2003. The court therefore declared the law void, defending
the president’s veto power from dilution. It was again the Constitutional
Court that decided, in September 2004, that the referendum could
go ahead even though it calls for the nullification of non-existent
legislation.
The referendum’s political pedigree was worthy of a case study
in its own right, having been organized by the Workers’ Party,
the main bastion of Hungary’s unbowed communists. That the cause
was picked up by the famously anti-communist Fidesz is remarkable
- roughly analogous to a situation in which the MSZP would be seen
running with a proposal put forward by István Csurka’s radical
conservative Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP).
Rhetoric surrounding the referendum reflected the political nature
of the contest, as scare tactics were a key part of the campaign
on both sides. “If you don’t want there to be privatized hospitals,
where you have to pay for health services, for example HUF 625,000
to give birth, then you should vote ‘Yes’ this weekend,” said Fidesz’s
Gabriella Selmeczi in the run-up to the election.
Improving health-quality?
Meanwhile, the MSZP’s István Újhely also bent the truth severely
when he said that if the referendum passed, all clinics, private
practices, pharmacies and church-operated hospitals would have
to be nationalized. Yes, positive messages about policy were put
forward by the SZDSZ and by Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány,
who stressed that bringing private capital into the struggling
health care system would improve the quality of services.
But in the end, most voters preferred the devil they know (a state
system that is inefficient, often patient-unfriendly but “free”
– apart from unrealistically high taxes, the illegal and pernicious
practice of gratitude money and a few co-payments) to the devil
they don’t know (the potentially rapacious health capitalist).
Real privatization marches on
Although the Hospital Act is a dead issue, the referendum would
still have had some real long-term implications, putting the kibosh
on any future attempts to bring private capital into government-owned
clinics or hospitals - at least at the ownership level. But it
would not have had any effect on the outsourcing of services to
the private sector, which is the real issue in health care privatization
today, according to Péter Mihályi, professor of economics at Veszprém
University and a former senior government official responsible
for privatization and health care issues.
Actual moves to privatize hospitals have been limited to a handful
- one of them in the City of Körmend, where the process was overseen
by a Fidesz mayor. Kiskunhalas is another example. But there has
been only one outright sale of a hospital in Hungary. István Mikola,
former health minister under the Fidesz government, sold and shut
down the “Mentőkórház,” the former hospital belonging to the ambulance
service. He was quite right to do so, said Mihályi.
“State ownership works well in some cases, such as Debrecen. They
happen to be good people,” Mihályi said. “But elsewhere, working
under the same rules, state ownership works badly, such as in Budapest
or Szeged.”
While moves to sell hospitals have been few, the private sector
is steadily gaining in importance in terms of the provision of
services at state-run hospitals. Like private sector managers,
hospital directors have budgets they must meet, and in order to
get the maximum use of limited resources, they outsource an increasing
volume of services. As in the private sector, this generally means
savings of costly taxes and social security charges, Mihályi said.
Outsourced services, provided by private doctors or companies,
now amount to approximately 20 percent of the overall health care
market, according to Mihály, but in some areas of service, such
as diagnostics and anesthesiology, private services are in the
majority. About 90 percent of family doctors operate in private
practices, thanks to a reform introduced by the Fidesz government,
and laboratory work is about 30 percent private. In addition, state
hospitals sometimes resort to tax avoidance schemes as loose as
any in the private sector – Mihályi noted the trick of doctors
and nurses putting in their standard workday as state employees,
but instantly switching to work through an external, private contractor
once their considerable overtime hours kick in.
Hungary is not alone
The problems facing Hungary’s health sector are not unique. A
white paper on healthcare in Central Europe published in September
by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) says similar problems
face healthcare systems in the region: a shortage of family doctors,
an overabundance of specialists and hospital beds, scant attention
to preventive medicine and gaping funding deficits that create
a reliance on under-the-table payments.
The health care systems of the socialist era were focused on containing
epidemics, which required a lot of hospital beds and a preponderance
of specialist physicians, according to the report. The failure
to cut unneeded hospital beds and staff in transition is one of
the main drivers of the funding gap in the region’s health sectors
today. It has also driven down wages in the sector, resulting in
the widespread system of tipping, common across the region and
known in Hungary as gratitude money. The practice has been called
“hard corruption” by the European Union.
A survey carried out for the report showed that 72 percent of
questioned executives from the health sector, pharmaceutical companies
and governments believe new EU member states cannot afford universal
state-funded healthcare. Yet healthcare has been one of the most
neglected areas in terms of policy and reform throughout Central
Europe, and with a few exceptions, such as the privatization of
family practices, the systems today are little changed from those
in 1989. Reasons for the lack of health reform are simple, the
report argues: healthcare is politically sensitive and reform wasn’t
required for EU membership.
Going private no panacea
While private capital can help tackle these problems, it is not
a panacea. “In Central Europe’s conditions it may best serve as
a complement to central funding,” according to one of the EIU’s
central findings. Attempts in the Czech Republic and Poland to
introduce a German-style multiinsurer model have been costly, as
private (or in Poland’s case regional) funds have failed, requiring
the state to step in and pick up the pieces. Although there has
been a degree of success with complementary insurance schemes,
performance in this area has not been exemplary either, the EIU
stated.

MOST VOTERS preferred the devil they know (an inefficient state
system, often patient-unfriendly but “free”) to the devil they
don’t know (the potentially rapacious health capitalist).
Rather than focusing only on the public-private debate in health
care financing, governments should rethink funding systems that
pay hospitals for the amount of treatment carried out and general
practitioners for number of patients on the books, according to
the report. Medical efficiency should be rewarded, not volumes
of treatment. Substantively, the Dec. 5 vote on hospital privatization was a
red herring. Even if the referendum had passed, it would have prevented
only the sale of actual buildings and top-level operative responsibility
for Hungary’s state-owned hospital and clinics. It did not address,
and would not have stopped, the real trends in healthcare privatization
today - namely the outsourcing by the state owner of primary and
secondary healthcare services to private contractors, large and
small.
More importantly, the referendum did not speak to the real problems
of the health care sector, either on the funding side or the provision
side. As a result, today Hungary stands no closer to, and no farther
away from, introducing meaningful health policy changes. However,
the referendum has also helped put healthcare on the public agenda.
The vote makes it clear that most Hungarians want the state to
continue in its role as the country’s HMO, but even with that constraint,
there is still plenty of room for meaningful reform and the attraction
of private funding.
Healthcare staff and facilities, per 100,000 population
|
General practitioners |
Physicians |
Nurses |
Hospital beds |
| EU 15 |
102 |
380 |
670 |
611 |
| Czech Republic |
72 |
350 |
970 |
857 |
| Hungary |
66 |
320 |
850 |
710 |
| Poland |
na |
220 |
520 |
556 |
| Slovakia |
40 |
320 |
700 |
779 |
| Slovenia |
50 |
220 |
710 |
516 |
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, World Bank
|